1200KM / sigma-rule
Active Directory User Backdoors — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc. Active Directory User Backdoors — Sigma Rule. Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: @neu5ron. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2017-04-13 / 2024-02-26.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "security",
"definition": "Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\\Audit Policies\\Account Management\\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\\Audit Policies\\DS Access\\Audit Directory Service Changes"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: bf23cf7fd55b43733729da123ce24214324cad4a993d80051de8bd0bbe193629
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Active Directory User Backdoors
id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
references:
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-04-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
- attack.persistence
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 4738
filter_empty:
AllowedToDelegateTo:
- ''
- '-'
filter_null:
AllowedToDelegateTo: null
selection_5136_1:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
selection_5136_2:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: 'user'
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'
selection_5136_3:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.