1200KM / sigma-rule
Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d. Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2026-04-28 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 2fb0fc7147d4b403f306896889981445cdb52dff6bd2b09e4a3b55fe1a95f44e
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
id: 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d
status: test
description: |
Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/credential-theft-expanding-your-reach-pt-2
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/
author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits)
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1003.003
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\print.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Print.EXE'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '/D'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\config\SAM'
- '\config\SECURITY'
- '\config\SYSTEM'
- '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_print_dump_sensitive_files/info.yml
False positives
- Unlikely
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.