1200KM / sigma-rule
Driver Load From A Temporary Directory — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75. Driver Load From A Temporary Directory — Sigma Rule. Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2017-02-12 / 2021-11-27.
{
"category": "driver_load",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 5d9a6fc63116fee3880311799fdd80e6d152fba1d43c0ed9b9bf148b4658f52d
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Driver Load From A Temporary Directory
id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
status: test
description: Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|contains: '\Temp\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
level: high
False positives
- There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
Source references
- Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.