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Uncommon Service Installation Image Path — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 26481afe-db26-4228-b264-25a29fe6efc7. Uncommon Service Installation Image Path — Sigma Rule. Detects uncommon service installation commands by looking at suspicious or uncommon image path values containing references to encoded powershell commands, temporary paths, etc.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-03-18 / 2024-02-09.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "service": "system"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: f51547fdb7c0fccde7163c84b50adc0521efc1618958a54fffdc5d4332c34b8a

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Uncommon Service Installation Image Path
id: 26481afe-db26-4228-b264-25a29fe6efc7
related:
    - id: ca83e9f3-657a-45d0-88d6-c1ac280caf53
      type: obsolete
    - id: 1d61f71d-59d2-479e-9562-4ff5f4ead16b
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon service installation commands by looking at suspicious or uncommon image path values containing references to encoded powershell commands, temporary paths, etc.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-18
modified: 2024-02-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - car.2013-09-005
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    suspicious_paths:
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '\\\\.\\pipe'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    suspicious_encoded_flag:
        ImagePath|contains: ' -e'
    suspicious_encoded_keywords:
        ImagePath|contains:
            - ' aQBlAHgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' aWV4I' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' IAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' JAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' PAA' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' SQBFAFgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
            - ' SUVYI' # PowerShell encoded commands
    filter_optional_thor_remote:
        ImagePath|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\thor10-remote\thor64.exe'
    filter_main_defender_def_updates:
        ImagePath|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\'
    condition: selection and ( suspicious_paths or all of suspicious_encoded_* ) and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

  • Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.