1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99. Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM — Sigma Rule. Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2021-05-22 / 2024-03-05.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f87f2076a89da5b73ac1ebeb8b1d3d7832f0c06783de3114769470d3d8cca7f8
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM
id: 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99
related:
- id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23 # PsExec specific rule
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-22
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
CommandLine|contains|windash:
# Note that you don't need to add the ".exe" part when using psexec/paexec
# The "-" can also be replaced with "/"
# The order of args isn't important
# "cmd" can be replaced by "powershell", "pwsh" or any other console like software
- ' -s cmd'
- ' -s -i cmd'
- ' -i -s cmd'
# Pwsh (For PowerShell 7)
- ' -s pwsh'
- ' -s -i pwsh'
- ' -i -s pwsh'
# PowerShell (For PowerShell 5)
- ' -s powershell'
- ' -s -i powershell'
- ' -i -s powershell'
filter_main_exclude_coverage:
# This filter exclude strings covered by 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
CommandLine|contains:
- 'paexec'
- 'PsExec'
- 'accepteula'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Weird admins that rename their tools
- Software companies that bundle PsExec/PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
level: high
False positives
- Weird admins that rename their tools
- Software companies that bundle PsExec/PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.