1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1. Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline. The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository. Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-07-12 / 2023-04-11.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: bd46719d891e2496bbc5f2b416ee7ba9659ac2026aa842a1b9d12e5c05a45046
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
id: 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline.
The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository.
Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
- https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/75260568a7ffe61b2458ca05f6f25914efb44337/win_mofcomp_execution.yml
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/mofcomp
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-04-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mofcomp.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'mofcomp.exe'
selection_case:
- ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wsl.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
- '%temp%'
- '%tmp%'
- '%appdata%'
filter_main_wmiprvse:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
filter_optional_null_parent:
# Sometimes the parent information isn't available from the Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing provider.
CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.