1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b. Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks — Sigma Rule. Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-07-28 / 2022-11-18.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 0388c33b7cc1bf996ca359c972cb26aaef48724dd24a3d803f4cf59552514917
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
related:
- id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4 # Security-Audting Eventlog
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
references:
- Internal Research
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_schtasks:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' /Change '
- ' /TN '
selection_susp_locations:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
- '\Desktop\'
- '\Downloads\'
- '\Temporary Internet'
- 'C:\ProgramData\'
- 'C:\Perflogs\'
- '%ProgramData%'
- '%appdata%'
- '%comspec%'
- '%localappdata%'
selection_susp_images:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'cmd /c '
- 'cmd /k '
- 'cmd /r '
- 'cmd.exe /c '
- 'cmd.exe /k '
- 'cmd.exe /r '
- 'powershell'
- 'mshta'
- 'wscript'
- 'cscript'
- 'certutil'
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'bash.exe'
- 'bash '
- 'scrcons'
- 'wmic '
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'forfiles'
- 'scriptrunner'
- 'hh.exe'
- 'hh '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.