1200KM / sigma-rule
Service Installation with Suspicious Folder Pattern — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1b2ae822-6fe1-43ba-aa7c-d1a3b3d1d5f2. Service Installation with Suspicious Folder Pattern — Sigma Rule. Detects service installation with suspicious folder patterns
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-03-18 / 2022-03-24.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "system"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: c496c8b40b34096ec8d355993434c25bc8fc648fafcfc19d2ddb85c3c43eaa96
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Service Installation with Suspicious Folder Pattern
id: 1b2ae822-6fe1-43ba-aa7c-d1a3b3d1d5f2
status: test
description: Detects service installation with suspicious folder patterns
references:
- Internal Research
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-18
modified: 2022-03-24
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- car.2013-09-005
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_eid:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
selection_img_paths:
- ImagePath|re: '^[Cc]:\\[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata\\.{1,9}\.exe'
- ImagePath|re: '^[Cc]:\\.{1,9}\.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.