1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 15619216-e993-4721-b590-4c520615a67d. Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity — Sigma Rule. Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service starting
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2019-10-26 / 2023-02-05.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 88fe73438af18fbe00d308b30f9fde8d9873b18f76ca5f259d599b2459d9ff71
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity
id: 15619216-e993-4721-b590-4c520615a67d
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service starting
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134.001
- attack.t1134.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
ParentImage|endswith: '\services.exe'
selection_technique_1:
# Examples:
# Meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
# CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded env var): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
# CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/c'
- 'echo'
- '\pipe\'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cmd'
- '%COMSPEC%'
selection_technique_2:
# meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'rundll32'
- '.dll,a'
- '/p:'
filter_defender:
CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun'
condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_technique_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Commandlines containing components like cmd accidentally
- Jobs and services started with cmd
level: high
False positives
- Commandlines containing components like cmd accidentally
- Jobs and services started with cmd
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.