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NTDS.DIT Creation By Uncommon Process — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 11b1ed55-154d-4e82-8ad7-83739298f720. NTDS.DIT Creation By Uncommon Process — Sigma Rule. Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database) by an uncommon process or a process located in a suspicious directory

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-01-11 / 2022-07-14.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "category": "file_event"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 4436b490503eff6815d67437c67e4e34f6cb74c2fdbbcdd12565cfba9027d8e5

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: NTDS.DIT Creation By Uncommon Process
id: 11b1ed55-154d-4e82-8ad7-83739298f720
related:
    - id: 4e7050dd-e548-483f-b7d6-527ab4fa784d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database) by an uncommon process or a process located in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://stealthbits.com/blog/extracting-password-hashes-from-the-ntds-dit-file/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2398
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_ntds:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\ntds.dit'
    selection_process_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious processes as you see fit
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
    selection_process_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Public\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
    condition: selection_ntds and 1 of selection_process_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.