1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981. Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness — Sigma Rule. Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with Medium integrity level
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2019-10-26 / 2024-12-01.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: a41cf2e87c38863275bd827b6ac32debc1ce5bfff609e34d3e06c059f793df0b
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness
id: 0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981
status: test
description: Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with Medium integrity level
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/31/insecure-registry-permissions/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.011
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'Medium'
- 'S-1-16-8192'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'ControlSet'
- 'services'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\ImagePath'
- '\FailureCommand'
- '\ServiceDll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.