1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae. Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI — Sigma Rule. Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe"
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2023-10-09 / not supplied.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e85329b3cb132b67951ac1d34fd2580df3a87bbec08c9d2f4316fecf0ec1a487
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI
id: 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae
related:
- id: a8f866e1-bdd4-425e-a27a-37619238d9c7
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe"
references:
- https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305
- https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/
- https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl)
date: 2023-10-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1564.004
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
# Note: Both Sysmon and ETW are unable to log the presence of such stream in the CommandLine. But EDRs such as Crowdstrike are able to using for example CMD console history. Users are advised to test this before usage
CommandLine|contains: '::$index_allocation'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
False positives
- Unlikely
Source references
- https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305
- https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/
- https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.