1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Access Token Abuse — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 02f7c9c1-1ae8-4c6a-8add-04693807f92f. Potential Access Token Abuse — Sigma Rule. Detects potential token impersonation and theft. Example, when using "DuplicateToken(Ex)" and "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" with the "LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag".
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-11-06 / 2023-04-26.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "security"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 589834efb8d53a4d0915a528a277c56db7c75dc00828b75f69d45dc7b0d8e909
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Access Token Abuse
id: 02f7c9c1-1ae8-4c6a-8add-04693807f92f
status: test
description: Detects potential token impersonation and theft. Example, when using "DuplicateToken(Ex)" and "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" with the "LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag".
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/how-attackers-abuse-access-token-manipulation
- https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/cyber-security/access-token-manipulation.html
author: Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis
date: 2022-11-06
modified: 2023-04-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134.001
- stp.4u
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 9
LogonProcessName: 'Advapi'
AuthenticationPackageName: 'Negotiate'
ImpersonationLevel: '%%1833' # Impersonation
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Anti-Virus
level: medium
False positives
- Anti-Virus
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.