1200KM / detection
T1406.002 Software Packing — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1406.002 Software Packing: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0644 Detection of Software Packing
AN1721 Analytic 1721
From the defender view: a sandboxed process receives/creates a high-entropy Mach-O/bundle or encrypted segment, performs in-memory decrypt/unpack (mmap/mprotect RW→RX or RWX), optionally drops a transient image in app-writable dirs, then loads it through dyld/dlopen or spawns it. We correlate: (1) opaque blob write/arrival → (2) kernel memory protection changes → (3) dyld/dlopen from app-writable path or posix_spawn of a recently created image → (4) (optional) code-sign evaluation anomalies for the new image.
AN1722 Analytic 1722
From the defender view: a sandboxed app handles a high-entropy executable blob, performs rapid decode/decrypt in memory (often with RW→RX or execmem friction), optionally emits a transient .dex/.so into app-writable paths, then immediately loads/executes it (DexClassLoader/dlopen) or spawns a helper. We correlate: (1) opaque blob write/arrival → (2) decode/unpack or memory protection change → (3) new code artifact or byte[] class definition → (4) dynamic load/exec within a tight window.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1406.002 simulation workspace
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.