1200KM / detection
T1692.002 Reporting Message — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1692.002 Reporting Message: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0746 Detection of Spoof Reporting Message
AN1879 Analytic 1879
Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity which may precede this technique. Monitor asset logs for alarms or other information the adversary is unable to directly suppress. Relevant alarms include those from a loss of communications due to Adversary-in-the-Middle activity. Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Monitor for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning via new services/daemons which may be used to enable this technique. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay. Spoofed reporting messages may be detected by reviewing the content of automation protocols, either through detecting based on expected values or comparing to other out of band process data sources. Spoofed messages may not precisely match legitimate messages which may lead to malformed traffic, although traffic may be malformed for many benign reasons. Monitor reporting messages for changes in how they are constructed. Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1692.002 simulation workspace
- Device Alarm · DC0108
- Network Traffic Content · DC0085
- Network Traffic Flow · DC0078
- Windows Registry Key Modification · DC0063
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.