1200KM / detection
T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0764 Detection of Adversary-in-the-Middle
AN1896 Analytic 1896
Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) Windows host simultaneously holding connections to both the field device subnet and an unexpected external or inter-zone destination, combined with proxy-capable process spawning and ICS vendor application logs showing endpoint or certificate changes. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.
AN2115 Analytic 2115
Real-time monitoring identifies a process on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux asset with both a listening socket on an ICS protocol port and an outbound connection to a non-ICS destination, combined with iptables DNAT rules redirecting ICS protocol port traffic. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.
AN2176 Analytic 2176
Real-time monitoring identifies network device configuration changes (network address translation rules, static routes, access control list modifications) combined with NetFlow path deviations for Industrial Control System (ICS) device traffic and Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate issuer anomalies in Operational Technology (OT) management traffic. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.
AN2238 Analytic 2238
Real-time network monitoring identifies a field device's source Media Access Control (MAC) address changing without a corresponding documented hardware replacement, combined with protocol-level anomalies (transaction identifier reuse, function-code patterns deviating from baseline) for traffic associated with that device Internet Protocol (IP) address. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
- Application Log Content · DC0038
- Network Connection Creation · DC0082
- Network Traffic Content · DC0085
- Network Traffic Flow · DC0078
- Process Creation · DC0032
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Complete technique engineering workbook
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.