1200KM / detection
T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates: 4 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Certificate Private Key Acquired · test · medium · {"product":"windows","service":"capi2","definition":"Requirements: The CAPI2 Operational log needs to be enabled"}
- Certificate Exported From Local Certificate Store · test · medium · {"product":"windows","service":"certificateservicesclient-lifecycle-system"}
- HackTool - Certify Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- HackTool - Certipy Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0240 Detection Strategy for Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
AN0671 Analytic 0671
Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment and usage activity in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), registry access to certificate storage locations, and unusual process executions that attempt to export or access private keys.
AN0672 Analytic 0672
Monitor for file access to certificate directories, commands invoking OpenSSL or PKCS#12 utilities to export or modify certificates, and processes accessing sensitive key storage paths.
AN0673 Analytic 0673
Monitor for security commands and API calls interacting with the Keychain, as well as file access attempts to stored certificates and private keys in ~/Library/Keychains or /Library/Keychains.
AN0674 Analytic 0674
Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment events in identity platforms, unexpected use of token-signing certificates, and unusual CA configuration modifications.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.