1200KM / detection
T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable: 2 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Trusted Path Bypass via Windows Directory Spoofing · experimental · high · {"category":"image_load","product":"windows"}
- Potential Suspicious Activity Using SeCEdit · test · medium · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0004 Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow using Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable.
AN0009 Analytic 0009
Abnormal modification of the PATH environment variable or registry keys controlling system paths, combined with execution of binaries named after legitimate system tools from user-writable directories. Defender correlates registry modifications, file creation of suspicious binaries, and process execution paths inconsistent with baseline system directories.
AN0010 Analytic 0010
User modification of the $PATH environment variable in shell configuration files or direct runtime PATH changes, followed by execution of binaries from user-controlled directories. Defender observes file edits to ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, or /etc/paths.d and process execution resolving to unexpected binary locations.
AN0011 Analytic 0011
Modification of PATH or HOME environment variables through shell config files, launchctl, or /etc/paths.d entries, combined with process execution from attacker-controlled directories. Defender correlates file changes in /etc/paths.d with process execution resolving to malicious binaries.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.