1200KM / detection
T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation: 6 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Azure Device or Configuration Modified or Deleted · test · medium · {"product":"azure","service":"activitylogs"}
- Azure DNS Zone Modified or Deleted · test · medium · {"product":"azure","service":"activitylogs"}
- Commands to Clear or Remove the Syslog - Builtin · test · high · {"product":"linux"}
- History File Deletion · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"linux"}
- Potential Suspicious Change To Sensitive/Critical Files · test · medium · {"category":"process_creation","product":"linux"}
- Cisco Denial of Service · test · medium · {"product":"cisco","service":"aaa"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0193 Detection Strategy for Stored Data Manipulation across OS Platforms.
AN0555 Analytic 0555
Identify unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification of business-critical stored data such as Office documents, database files, and log archives. Detect anomalous processes modifying stored data outside of expected workflows (e.g., non-database processes modifying database files).
AN0556 Analytic 0556
Detect suspicious file creation, modification, or deletion in stored data directories (e.g., `/var/lib/mysql/`, `/var/log/`, mail spools). Identify shell commands interacting directly with structured data files instead of legitimate database utilities.
AN0557 Analytic 0557
Monitor sensitive data files such as plist-based storage, mail archives, or Office files for unexpected modifications. Detect anomalous processes modifying stored data outside expected update cycles using FSEvents and Unified Logs.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1565.001 simulation workspace
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.