1200KM / detection
T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0192 Detection Strategy for Email Hiding Rules
AN0551 Analytic 0551
Suspicious creation or modification of inbox rules through PowerShell (New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule) to automatically delete, move, or hide emails. Defender perspective: unusual rule activity correlated with mailbox access and filtering patterns.
AN0552 Analytic 0552
Alterations to plist configuration files (RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, MessageRules.plist) that define email hiding or filtering rules. Defender perspective: unexpected changes in these files associated with Mail.app processes.
AN0553 Analytic 0553
Rule manipulation through local email clients (e.g., Evolution, Thunderbird) or server-side filtering scripts (e.g., sieve) creating conditions to move or discard emails with security-related keywords.
AN0554 Analytic 0554
Suspicious rule creation within Outlook or Exchange clients, including auto-move or delete conditions tied to incident or security alert keywords. Defender perspective: correlation between missing inbound emails and newly added mailbox rules.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1564.008 simulation workspace
- Application Log Content · DC0038
- Command Execution · DC0064
- File Modification · DC0061
- Process Creation · DC0032
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.