1200KM / detection
T1560 Archive Collected Data — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1560 Archive Collected Data: 2 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Compressed File Creation Via Tar.EXE · test · low · {"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"}
- Compressed File Extraction Via Tar.EXE · test · low · {"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0526 Detect Archiving and Encryption of Collected Data (T1560)
AN1458 Analytic 1458
Detects adversarial archiving of files prior to exfiltration by correlating execution of compression/encryption utilities (e.g., makecab.exe, rar.exe, 7z.exe, powershell Compress-Archive) with subsequent creation of large compressed or encrypted files. Identifies abnormal process lineage involving crypt32.dll usage, command-line arguments invoking compression switches, and file write operations to temporary or staging directories.
AN1459 Analytic 1459
Detects adversarial archiving activity through invocation of utilities like tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl used in non-administrative or unusual contexts. Correlates command execution patterns with file creation of compressed/encrypted outputs in staging directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).
AN1460 Analytic 1460
Detects use of macOS-native archiving or encryption tools (zip, ditto, hdiutil) for staging collected data. Identifies unexpected invocation of archive utilities by Office apps, browsers, or background daemons. Correlates file creation of .zip/.dmg containers with process lineage anomalies.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.