1200KM / detection
T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0088 Backup Software Discovery via CLI, Registry, and Process Inspection (T1518.002)
AN0240 Analytic 0240
Defender observes execution of commands like `tasklist`, `sc query`, `reg query`, or PowerShell WMI/Registry queries targeting known backup products (e.g., Veeam, Acronis, CrashPlan). Behavior often includes parent-child lineage involving PowerShell or cmd.exe with discovery syntax, and enumeration of services, directories, or registry paths tied to backup software.
AN0241 Analytic 0241
Defender observes use of CLI tools (`find`, `grep`, `ls`, `dpkg`, `rpm`, `systemctl`, `ps aux`) to discover backup agents or config files (e.g., rsnapshot, duplicity, veeam). This often includes command lines that recursively search `/etc/`, `/opt/`, or `/var/` directories for keywords like `backup`, and parent-child relationships involving shell or Python scripts.
AN0242 Analytic 0242
Defender detects execution of `mdfind`, `launchctl`, or GUI-based enumeration (e.g., `/Applications/Time Machine.app`) along with command-line usage of `find`, `grep`, or `system_profiler` to identify installed backup tools like Time Machine, Carbon Copy Cloner, or Backblaze. Often triggered from Terminal sessions or within post-exploitation scripts.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1518.002 simulation workspace
- File Access · DC0055
- File Creation · DC0039
- Process Creation · DC0032
- Windows Registry Key Modification · DC0063
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.