1200KM / detection
T1218.013 Mavinject — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1218.013 Mavinject: 2 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Mavinject Inject DLL Into Running Process · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0433 Detecting Code Injection via mavinject.exe (App-V Injector)
AN1207 Analytic 1207
Abuse of mavinject.exe to inject DLLs or import descriptors into another running process. Chain: (1) mavinject.exe starts with /INJECTRUNNING or /HMODULE → (2) mavinject obtains high-access handles to a target process (VM_WRITE/CREATE_THREAD) → (3) target process loads attacker DLL (module load) → (4) optional follow-on child activity or network egress from the target process.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1218.013 simulation workspace
- Command Execution · DC0064
- File Creation · DC0039
- Module Load · DC0016
- Network Connection Creation · DC0082
- Process Access · DC0035
- Process Creation · DC0032
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.