1200KM / detection
T1090.004 Domain Fronting — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1090.004 Domain Fronting: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0196 Domain Fronting Behavior via Mismatched TLS SNI and HTTP Host Headers
AN0564 Analytic 0564
Suspicious outbound HTTPS connections where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) does not match the HTTP Host header, indicating potential use of domain fronting to mask C2 traffic via CDNs.
AN0565 Analytic 0565
Applications such as `curl`, `wget`, or custom binaries initiate HTTPS connections where the TLS SNI is mismatched or absent while HTTP Host targets CDN-available C2 endpoints.
AN0566 Analytic 0566
Unsigned or user-space apps initiate TLS connections with one hostname and HTTP headers requesting a different domain, commonly abused in CDN-resident domain fronting techniques.
AN0567 Analytic 0567
Traffic originating from ESXi hosts or management interfaces displays SNI-to-Host mismatch behavior, particularly anomalous given typical infrastructure communication patterns.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.