1200KM / detection
T1036.007 Double File Extension — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1036.007 Double File Extension: 3 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Suspicious Double Extension Files · test · high · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created · test · medium · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious Parent Double Extension File Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0366 Detection Strategy for Double File Extension Masquerading
AN1033 Analytic 1033
Detects adversary behavior where a file with a benign-looking first extension (e.g., .txt, .jpg) ends with a dangerous second extension (e.g., .exe, .scr), and is subsequently executed. The behavior chain includes file creation with misleading naming and user or system-initiated process execution from the disguised file.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1036.007 simulation workspace
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.