- AN1025 · Analytic 1025 — Detection of domain group enumeration through command-line utilities such as 'net group /domain' or PowerShell cmdlets, followed by suspicious access to API calls or LSASS memory.
- AN1026 · Analytic 1026 — Behavioral detection of domain group enumeration via ldapsearch or custom scripts leveraging LDAP over the network.
- AN1027 · Analytic 1027 — Enumeration of domain groups using dscacheutil or dscl commands, often following initial login or domain trust queries.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Domain Groups
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
ATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionAttack Playbook — Operation DragonRx
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionOperation DragonRx — APT41 Full Attack Simulation
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionAttack Playbook Operation DragonRx
1200km Medium · authored report mention
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionAttack Playbook — Operation DragonRx
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionOperation DragonRx — APT41 Full Attack Simulation
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionAttack Playbook Operation DragonRx
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Intelligence requirements, hypotheses, and collection planning
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Governed topic match · 48/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Governed topic match · 48/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.