- AN0317 · Analytic 0317 — Detects attempts to enumerate local groups via Net.exe, PowerShell, or native API calls that precede lateral movement or privilege abuse.
- AN0318 · Analytic 0318 — Detects enumeration of local groups using common binaries (groups, getent, cat /etc/group) or scripting with suspicious lineage.
- AN0319 · Analytic 0319 — Detects use of dscl or id/group commands to enumerate local system groups, often by post-exploitation tools or persistence checks.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Local Groups
Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. Commands such as net localgroup of the Net utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Module 7 — Privilege, lateral movement, and controlled impact
Red Team & Offensive Security · Exact technique name · 92/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
Red Team & Offensive Security · Exact technique name · 92/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.