Linux Audit object paths
Linux Audit object paths. PATH records describe objects associated with a kernel audit event.
Source and collection
Typically /var/log/audit/audit.log when auditd is configured; audit transport records can be aggregated differently.
Review audit rules, backlog/lost-event counters, daemon state and retention. Use ausearch with an authorized local log copy.
Native example and provenance
upstream test fixture. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.
Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — line 41
One complete record selected; values unchanged.
Pinned source commit: 9ae756f00f82786ac3496ce99c2dd288c5a5c031
Download the exact sample · Offline research kit
SHA-256: 94e86c0f25a12bc05a2b67814b1753f676cc1840103449aac7e25cd88692ed92
type=PATH msg=audit(1481077231.371:479): item=0 name="/sbin/auditctl" inode=17367907 dev=08:01 mode=0100750 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:auditctl_exec_t:s0 objtype=NORMAL
Structure and field interpretation
| Field/path | Serialized type |
|---|---|
raw record | audit |
- type
- Audit record type.
- msg=audit(epoch:serial)
- Timestamp and serial used to group records.
- auid / uid
- Login identity and effective process context differ.
- arch
- Syscall architecture discriminator when present.
Investigation uses
- Join item, inode and path to the corresponding syscall and device context.
- Preserve the raw record and its complete event group before enrichment or normalization.
Validation boundaries
A PATH record alone does not prove a file write, successful access or exfiltration.
This text sample passed byte-integrity and record-framing checks. Its field interpretation follows the cited format; a vendor-specific semantic parser has not been certified.
For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.
Related sources
Ecosystem connections
- Telemetry Library — ATT&CK data components
- Detection Rules — candidate detection content
- Threat hunting — from intelligence to validated defense
- Practical security learning paths
- AdversaryGraph — evidence-led investigation
References
Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.