MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference
AML.T0109
AI Supply Chain Rug Pull
MITRE source definition
Adversaries may publish legitimate AI components or software, gain user adoption, then push an update with a malicious variant, leading to [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010). More scrutiny is often placed on a supply chain dependency when it is first being considered for inclusion in an AI system. Performing a rug pull may allow adversaries to bypass these defenses and be more likely to achieve Initial Access.
Adversaries may [Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts](/techniques/AML.T0115), then attempt to gain user trust and increase adoption before performing the rug pull (See [AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation](/techniques/AML.T0111)).
Source modified 2026-05-27. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.
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Source-backed defensive context
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Simulation and telemetry boundary
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