MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference
AML.T0101
Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation
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MITRE source definition
Adversaries may invoke an AI agent's tool capable of performing mutative operations to perform Data Destruction. Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
Source modified 2026-05-27. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.
Parent, sub-techniques and ATT&CK references
No explicit relationship in this pinned source.
Source-backed defensive context
MITRE mitigations
- AML.M0024 AI Telemetry Logging
- AML.M0026 Privileged AI Agent Permissions Configuration
- AML.M0027 Single-User AI Agent Permissions Configuration
- AML.M0028 AI Agent Tools Permissions Configuration
- AML.M0029 Human In-the-Loop for AI Agent Actions
- AML.M0030 Restrict AI Agent Tool Invocation on Untrusted Data
MITRE case studies
- AML.CS0046 Data Destruction via Indirect Prompt Injection Targeting Claude Computer-Use · Exercise
- AML.CS0047 Code to Deploy Destructive AI Agent Discovered in Amazon Q VS Code Extension · Incident
- AML.CS0063 Prompt-Based Attacks Against Gemini via Calendar Invitations · Exercise
These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage. The local relationship indexes link back to the pinned MITRE source.
Detection and collection design
No executable detector is supplied by this ATLAS source import. Define detection against the specific behavior in the full definition above. MITRE case-study and mitigation relationships supply context, not tested rule coverage.
MITRE explicitly links AI Telemetry Logging to this technique. Use that guidance to identify system-appropriate records.
Depending on the selected scenario, the experiment may need dataset/model versions, data-access and build audit records, inference or application traces, or agent tool authorization records. These are planning options, not asserted mappings. Minimize sensitive prompt/data capture and retain provenance.
Anomaly detection design
No exact ATLAS anomaly detector is validated here. Select a measurable feature from the behavior definition; compare like-for-like model versions, workloads and identities. Changes caused by model upgrades, retrieval corpora or legitimate workload shifts must be controls, not automatically labelled attacks.
Tools and reproducible source scenarios
No lab-tool association is invented from the technique name. Inspect the exact source scenarios below for the tools and environment actually used; a case study is not itself an executable or safe lab.
Simulation experiment plan
Select an owned, disposable system implementing AML.T0101 Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation. Use synthetic data and sandboxed tools; disable production credentials, external side effects and data exfiltration. For poisoning or supply-chain tests, use throwaway artifacts rather than real training or deployment pipelines.
- State the exact trust boundary and expected observable behavior.
- Pin model, application, dataset, tool permissions and evaluation inputs.
- Capture baseline and scenario traces, an authorized look-alike, and a missing-telemetry control.
- Evaluate the detector against independently labelled results; do not substitute model output claims for observed tool actions.
- Restore state and preserve redacted evidence.
Experiment worksheet — not fabricated telemetry
The export below is a planning record, not a native event, positive attack fixture or execution result. Unknown fields deliberately remain null.
{
"schema": "1200km.atlas.experiment-plan.v1",
"technique_id": "AML.T0101",
"simulation": false,
"target": "REQUIRES_OWNED_LAB",
"source_scenario": [
"AML.CS0046",
"AML.CS0047",
"AML.CS0063"
],
"input_artifact_hash": null,
"system_version": null,
"expected_observable": null,
"native_telemetry_location": null,
"baseline_reference": null,
"result": "not_run"
}Simulation and telemetry boundary
This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.
For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.
Provenance and attribution
Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0
Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE. Source text and explicit relationships are retained; navigation, formatting and local links are provided by 1200km.
No explicit relationship in this pinned source.