MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference
AML.T0051
LLM Prompt Injection
MITRE source definition
An adversary may craft malicious prompts as inputs to an LLM that cause the LLM to act in unintended ways. These "prompt injections" are often designed to cause the model to ignore aspects of its original instructions and follow the adversary's instructions instead.
Prompt Injections can be an initial access vector to the LLM that provides the adversary with a foothold to carry out other steps in their operation. They may be designed to bypass defenses in the LLM, or allow the adversary to issue privileged commands. The effects of a prompt injection can persist throughout an interactive session with an LLM.
Malicious prompts may be injected directly by the adversary ([Direct](/techniques/AML.T0051.000)) either to leverage the LLM to generate harmful content or to gain a foothold on the system and lead to further effects. Prompts may also be injected indirectly when the LLM, as part of its normal operation, ingests the malicious prompt from another data source ([Indirect](/techniques/AML.T0051.001)). This type of injection can be used by the adversary to gain a foothold on the system or to target the user of the LLM. Malicious prompts may also be [Triggered](/techniques/AML.T0051.002) by user actions or system events.
Source modified 2026-05-27. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.
Parent, sub-techniques and ATT&CK references
Source-backed defensive context
MITRE mitigations
- AML.M0019 Control Access to AI Models and Data in Production
- AML.M0020 Generative AI Guardrails
- AML.M0021 Generative AI Guidelines
- AML.M0022 Generative AI Model Alignment
- AML.M0024 AI Telemetry Logging
- AML.M0033 Input and Output Validation for AI Agent Components
- AML.M0035 AI Red Team
MITRE case studies
These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage.
Simulation and telemetry boundary
This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.
For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.
Provenance and attribution
Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0
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No explicit relationship in this pinned source.