AML.T0049
Exploit Public-Facing Application

Detection and collection design

No executable detector is supplied by this ATLAS source import. Define detection against the specific behavior in the full definition above. MITRE case-study and mitigation relationships supply context, not tested rule coverage.

No explicit AI Telemetry Logging mitigation relationship was found for this technique. Do not manufacture a sensor mapping from its tactic.

Depending on the selected scenario, the experiment may need dataset/model versions, data-access and build audit records, inference or application traces, or agent tool authorization records. These are planning options, not asserted mappings. Minimize sensitive prompt/data capture and retain provenance.

Anomaly detection design

No exact ATLAS anomaly detector is validated here. Select a measurable feature from the behavior definition; compare like-for-like model versions, workloads and identities. Changes caused by model upgrades, retrieval corpora or legitimate workload shifts must be controls, not automatically labelled attacks.

Baseline and validation methodology · AI-security ecosystem

Tools and reproducible source scenarios

No lab-tool association is invented from the technique name. Inspect the exact source scenarios below for the tools and environment actually used; a case study is not itself an executable or safe lab.

• AML.CS0023 ShadowRay: Hijacking Exposed Ray Clusters (Incident)
• AML.CS0028 AI Model Tampering via Supply Chain Attack (Exercise)
• AML.CS0030 LLM Jacking (Incident)
• AML.CS0052 LLMSmith: RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications (Exercise)
• AML.CS0068 Autonomous OpenAI Evaluation Agents Compromise Hugging Face Infrastructure (Incident)
• AML.CS0069 GTG-1002 Claude Code Espionage Campaign (Incident)
• AML.CS0070 Threat Actor Uses a DeepSeek-Powered Hermes Agent in Langflow and n8n Exploitation Attempts (Incident)
• AML.CS0071 Multi-Agent Framework Compromises Taiwanese Government Systems (Incident)

Simulation experiment plan

Select an owned, disposable system implementing AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application. Use synthetic data and sandboxed tools; disable production credentials, external side effects and data exfiltration. For poisoning or supply-chain tests, use throwaway artifacts rather than real training or deployment pipelines.

1. State the exact trust boundary and expected observable behavior.
2. Pin model, application, dataset, tool permissions and evaluation inputs.
3. Capture baseline and scenario traces, an authorized look-alike, and a missing-telemetry control.
4. Evaluate the detector against independently labelled results; do not substitute model output claims for observed tool actions.
5. Restore state and preserve redacted evidence.

Experiment worksheet — not fabricated telemetry

The export below is a planning record, not a native event, positive attack fixture or execution result. Unknown fields deliberately remain null.

{
  "schema": "1200km.atlas.experiment-plan.v1",
  "technique_id": "AML.T0049",
  "simulation": false,
  "target": "REQUIRES_OWNED_LAB",
  "source_scenario": [
    "AML.CS0023",
    "AML.CS0028",
    "AML.CS0030",
    "AML.CS0052",
    "AML.CS0068",
    "AML.CS0069",
    "AML.CS0070",
    "AML.CS0071"
  ],
  "input_artifact_hash": null,
  "system_version": null,
  "expected_observable": null,
  "native_telemetry_location": null,
  "baseline_reference": null,
  "result": "not_run"
}