MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference
AML.T0047
AI-Enabled Product or Service
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MITRE source definition
Adversaries may use a product or service that uses artificial intelligence under the hood to gain access to the underlying AI model. This type of indirect model access may reveal details of the AI model or its inferences in logs or metadata.
Source modified 2026-05-27. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.
Parent, sub-techniques and ATT&CK references
No explicit relationship in this pinned source.
Source-backed defensive context
MITRE mitigations
MITRE case studies
- AML.CS0003 Bypassing Cylance's AI Malware Detection · Exercise
- AML.CS0004 Camera Hijack Attack on Facial Recognition System · Incident
- AML.CS0008 ProofPoint Evasion · Exercise
- AML.CS0009 Tay Poisoning · Incident
- AML.CS0014 Confusing Antimalware Neural Networks · Exercise
- AML.CS0016 Achieving Code Execution in MathGPT via Prompt Injection · Exercise
- AML.CS0017 Bypassing ID.me Identity Verification · Incident
- AML.CS0026 Financial Transaction Hijacking with M365 Copilot as an Insider · Exercise
- AML.CS0033 Live Deepfake Image Injection to Evade Mobile KYC Verification · Exercise
- AML.CS0034 ProKYC: Deepfake Tool for Account Fraud Attacks · Incident
- AML.CS0035 Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via Indirect Prompt Injection · Exercise
- AML.CS0036 AIKatz: Attacking LLM Desktop Applications · Exercise
- AML.CS0037 Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio · Exercise
- AML.CS0060 Cross-Site Scripting via Prompt Manipulation in Lenovo AI Chatbot · Exercise
- AML.CS0061 AI in the Middle: Web-Based AI Services as C2 Relays · Exercise
- AML.CS0062 RCE Vulnerability in Semantic Kernel Search Plugin · Exercise
These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage. The local relationship indexes link back to the pinned MITRE source.
Detection and collection design
No executable detector is supplied by this ATLAS source import. Define detection against the specific behavior in the full definition above. MITRE case-study and mitigation relationships supply context, not tested rule coverage.
MITRE explicitly links AI Telemetry Logging to this technique. Use that guidance to identify system-appropriate records.
Depending on the selected scenario, the experiment may need dataset/model versions, data-access and build audit records, inference or application traces, or agent tool authorization records. These are planning options, not asserted mappings. Minimize sensitive prompt/data capture and retain provenance.
Anomaly detection design
No exact ATLAS anomaly detector is validated here. Select a measurable feature from the behavior definition; compare like-for-like model versions, workloads and identities. Changes caused by model upgrades, retrieval corpora or legitimate workload shifts must be controls, not automatically labelled attacks.
Tools and reproducible source scenarios
No lab-tool association is invented from the technique name. Inspect the exact source scenarios below for the tools and environment actually used; a case study is not itself an executable or safe lab.
- AML.CS0003 Bypassing Cylance's AI Malware Detection (Exercise)
- AML.CS0004 Camera Hijack Attack on Facial Recognition System (Incident)
- AML.CS0008 ProofPoint Evasion (Exercise)
- AML.CS0009 Tay Poisoning (Incident)
- AML.CS0014 Confusing Antimalware Neural Networks (Exercise)
- AML.CS0016 Achieving Code Execution in MathGPT via Prompt Injection (Exercise)
- AML.CS0017 Bypassing ID.me Identity Verification (Incident)
- AML.CS0026 Financial Transaction Hijacking with M365 Copilot as an Insider (Exercise)
- AML.CS0033 Live Deepfake Image Injection to Evade Mobile KYC Verification (Exercise)
- AML.CS0034 ProKYC: Deepfake Tool for Account Fraud Attacks (Incident)
- AML.CS0035 Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via Indirect Prompt Injection (Exercise)
- AML.CS0036 AIKatz: Attacking LLM Desktop Applications (Exercise)
- AML.CS0037 Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio (Exercise)
- AML.CS0060 Cross-Site Scripting via Prompt Manipulation in Lenovo AI Chatbot (Exercise)
- AML.CS0061 AI in the Middle: Web-Based AI Services as C2 Relays (Exercise)
- AML.CS0062 RCE Vulnerability in Semantic Kernel Search Plugin (Exercise)
Simulation experiment plan
Select an owned, disposable system implementing AML.T0047 AI-Enabled Product or Service. Use synthetic data and sandboxed tools; disable production credentials, external side effects and data exfiltration. For poisoning or supply-chain tests, use throwaway artifacts rather than real training or deployment pipelines.
- State the exact trust boundary and expected observable behavior.
- Pin model, application, dataset, tool permissions and evaluation inputs.
- Capture baseline and scenario traces, an authorized look-alike, and a missing-telemetry control.
- Evaluate the detector against independently labelled results; do not substitute model output claims for observed tool actions.
- Restore state and preserve redacted evidence.
Experiment worksheet — not fabricated telemetry
The export below is a planning record, not a native event, positive attack fixture or execution result. Unknown fields deliberately remain null.
{
"schema": "1200km.atlas.experiment-plan.v1",
"technique_id": "AML.T0047",
"simulation": false,
"target": "REQUIRES_OWNED_LAB",
"source_scenario": [
"AML.CS0003",
"AML.CS0004",
"AML.CS0008",
"AML.CS0009",
"AML.CS0014",
"AML.CS0016",
"AML.CS0017",
"AML.CS0026",
"AML.CS0033",
"AML.CS0034",
"AML.CS0035",
"AML.CS0036",
"AML.CS0037",
"AML.CS0060",
"AML.CS0061",
"AML.CS0062"
],
"input_artifact_hash": null,
"system_version": null,
"expected_observable": null,
"native_telemetry_location": null,
"baseline_reference": null,
"result": "not_run"
}Simulation and telemetry boundary
This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.
For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.
Provenance and attribution
Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0
Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE. Source text and explicit relationships are retained; navigation, formatting and local links are provided by 1200km.
No explicit relationship in this pinned source.