MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference
AML.T0010.005
AI Agent Tool
MITRE source definition
Adversaries may target AI agent tools as a means to compromise a victim's AI supply chain. Tools add capabilities to AI agents, allowing them to interact with other services, connect to data sources, access internet resources, run system tools, and execute code. They are an attractive target for adversaries because compromising an AI agent can provide them with broad access and permissions on the victim's system via the agent's other tools.
Poisoned AI agent tools may contain malicious definitions or instructions, hidden executable logic, or deliberately poisoned runtime responses (See [AI Agent Tool Poisoning](/techniques/AML.T0110)). These changes may manipulate the agent's behavior, modify how other tools are invoked, introduce hidden side effects, or provide unauthorized access to data and services. Adversaries have successfully used a poisoned MCP server to exfiltrate private user data [[koi]].
Agent tools have exploded in popularity, with thousands of MCP servers available publicly [[glama]]. They are often released on open-source software repositories such as GitHub, indexed on hubs specific to MCP servers [[mcp-hub]][[mcp-server-hub]], and published to package registries such as NPM. AI agents can also be connected to remotely-hosted tools [[remote-mcp]]. This creates an environment where malicious tools can proliferate rapidly and safeguards are often not in place.
Source modified 2026-07-31. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.
Parent, sub-techniques and ATT&CK references
Source-backed defensive context
MITRE mitigations
MITRE case studies
- AML.CS0049 Supply Chain Compromise via Poisoned ClawdBot Skill · Exercise
- AML.CS0053 Poisoned Postmark MCP Server Email Exfiltration · Incident
- AML.CS0054 Data Exfiltration via Remote Poisoned MCP Tool · Exercise
These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage.
Simulation and telemetry boundary
This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.
For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.
Provenance and attribution
Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0
Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE. Source text and explicit relationships are retained; navigation, formatting and local links are provided by 1200km.