MITRE ATLAS 2026.09 / technique reference

AML.T0002.002
AI Agent Configuration

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Agentic AIResource DevelopmentSource maturity: Demonstrated

MITRE source definition

Adversaries may acquire publicly accessible AI agent configuration files to understand agent capabilities, gain unauthorized access to tools and data sources, or identify credentials for further attacks. Configuration files define what tools an agent can use, credentials for external services, system prompts, and behavioral settings, making them valuable resources for adversaries targeting AI agent deployments.

Once configuration files are acquired, adversaries may perform Discover AI Agent Configuration to gain additional insights they can use in their operation or Credentials from AI Agent Configuration to harvest secrets.

AI agent configuration files come in multiple forms depending on the platform and agent framework. Agent configuration files adversaries may target include: - System prompts: Files containing agent instructions, behavioral guidelines, and internal logic. - Tool configuration: Files defining tools the agent can utilize, including Model Context Protocol (MCP) configs (e.g., `mcp.json`, `claude_desktop_config.json`), IDE-specific configs (e.g., `.claude/settings.json`, `.vscode/tasks.json`), and framework-specific settings that define external tool and data source integrations. - Skills and workflows: Files defining agent capabilities, behaviors, or workflows. Often a combination of instructions, scripts, and resources. - Environment and deployment configs: Files that control agent deployment and runtime behavior, often environment variables or framework-specific configs.

Source modified 2026-07-31. Reproduced from the pinned ATLAS release; inline technique links resolve to local reference pages.

Source-backed defensive context

MITRE mitigations

No explicit relationship in this pinned source.

MITRE case studies

These are explicit source relationships, not independently reproduced incidents or validated detection coverage. The local relationship indexes link back to the pinned MITRE source.

Detection and collection design

No executable detector is supplied by this ATLAS source import. Define detection against the specific behavior in the full definition above. MITRE case-study and mitigation relationships supply context, not tested rule coverage.

No explicit AI Telemetry Logging mitigation relationship was found for this technique. Do not manufacture a sensor mapping from its tactic.

Depending on the selected scenario, the experiment may need dataset/model versions, data-access and build audit records, inference or application traces, or agent tool authorization records. These are planning options, not asserted mappings. Minimize sensitive prompt/data capture and retain provenance.

Anomaly detection design

No exact ATLAS anomaly detector is validated here. Select a measurable feature from the behavior definition; compare like-for-like model versions, workloads and identities. Changes caused by model upgrades, retrieval corpora or legitimate workload shifts must be controls, not automatically labelled attacks.

Baseline and validation methodology · AI-security ecosystem

Tools and reproducible source scenarios

No lab-tool association is invented from the technique name. Inspect the exact source scenarios below for the tools and environment actually used; a case study is not itself an executable or safe lab.

Simulation experiment plan

Select an owned, disposable system implementing AML.T0002.002 AI Agent Configuration. Use synthetic data and sandboxed tools; disable production credentials, external side effects and data exfiltration. For poisoning or supply-chain tests, use throwaway artifacts rather than real training or deployment pipelines.

  1. State the exact trust boundary and expected observable behavior.
  2. Pin model, application, dataset, tool permissions and evaluation inputs.
  3. Capture baseline and scenario traces, an authorized look-alike, and a missing-telemetry control.
  4. Evaluate the detector against independently labelled results; do not substitute model output claims for observed tool actions.
  5. Restore state and preserve redacted evidence.

Experiment worksheet — not fabricated telemetry

The export below is a planning record, not a native event, positive attack fixture or execution result. Unknown fields deliberately remain null.

{
  "schema": "1200km.atlas.experiment-plan.v1",
  "technique_id": "AML.T0002.002",
  "simulation": false,
  "target": "REQUIRES_OWNED_LAB",
  "source_scenario": [
    "AML.CS0051"
  ],
  "input_artifact_hash": null,
  "system_version": null,
  "expected_observable": null,
  "native_telemetry_location": null,
  "baseline_reference": null,
  "result": "not_run"
}

Simulation and telemetry boundary

This is a technique reference page, not a runnable simulation. No ATLAS-specific telemetry mapping, local attack execution or detector validation is asserted. MITRE maturity describes its source evidence, not a 1200km lab result.

For broader context—not technique-specific control mappings—see AI Security, AI Security Course, and detection-validation methodology.

Provenance and attribution

Immutable MITRE ATLAS source · Import provenance · Attribution and transformation notice · Apache License 2.0

Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE. Source text and explicit relationships are retained; navigation, formatting and local links are provided by 1200km.

No explicit relationship in this pinned source.