Domains
Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control. Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD). Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines. Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names). Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history. Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars. In addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.
Observed actors
G0094EXOTIC LILY
G1011Dragonfly
G0035menuPass
G0045APT32
G0050Gamaredon Group
G0047TeamTNT
G0139FIN7
G0046Sandworm Team
G0034CURIUM
G1012Mustang Panda
G0129ZIRCONIUM
G0128TA2541
G1018Ferocious Kitten
G0137APT1
G0006Leviathan
G0065Winter Vivern
G1035TA505
G0092BITTER
G1002APT29
G0016Silent Librarian
G0122Star Blizzard
G1033LazyScripter
G0140APT28
G0007Winnti Group
G0044Lazarus Group
G0032Earth Lusca
G1006Transparent Tribe
G0134IndigoZebra
G0136Moonstone Sleet
G1036HEXANE
G1001Magic Hound
G0059Threat Group-3390
G0027