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T1542.002 · persistence, defense-evasion · 1 actors · 0 correlated reports

Component Firmware

Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.

Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace

Detection logic

Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.

Observed actors

Correlated CTI and IR reports

Cyber Knowledge context

Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.

MITRE mitigations

M1051 · Update Software

Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Regular Operating System Updates - Implementation: Apply the latest Windows security updates monthly using WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) or a similar patch management solution. Configure systems to check for updates automatically and schedule reboots during maintenance windows. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of OS vulnerabilities such as privilege escalation or remote code execution. Application Patching - Implementation: Monitor Apache's update release notes for security patches addressing vulnerabiliti…

MITRE mitigation source

MITRE detection strategies and analytics

DET0323 · Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
  • AN0916 · Analytic 0916 — Detection of anomalous driver and firmware interactions, including unsigned or unexpected firmware updates, driver loads linked to hardware components, and suspicious use of privileged APIs to read/write firmware or controller memory.
  • AN0917 · Analytic 0917 — Detection of suspicious use of ioctl/sysfs calls to access device firmware, unexpected flashing tools execution, and anomalous firmware checksums logged by SMART or kernel audit mechanisms.
  • AN0918 · Analytic 0918 — Detection of EFI/firmware manipulation attempts via abnormal driver loads, unsigned kexts, or tampered NVRAM variables associated with component firmware configuration.
MITRE detection source

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