- AN0865 · Analytic 0865 — Detects unauthorized additions of users or machine accounts to privileged local or domain groups (e.g., Administrators, Remote Desktop Users).
- AN0866 · Analytic 0866 — Detects unexpected use of usermod, gpasswd, or direct modification of /etc/group to elevate user group membership.
- AN0867 · Analytic 0867 — Detects use of `dseditgroup` or `dscl` to add users to privileged macOS groups (e.g., admin).
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Additional Local or Domain Groups
An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft RDP Logons) Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for elevated privileges. In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022)
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Use behavior-focused telemetry and validate findings against surrounding activity.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Vulnerability Research & Exploit Development · Governed topic match · 51/100Scenario-based cyber risk assessment and treatment
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 39/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 4 — Detection engineering and detection as code
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Disk, file-system, and persistence forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Binary formats, ABI, loaders, and mitigations
Vulnerability Research & Exploit Development · Tactic learning route · 24/100Network, edge, service communication, hybrid access, and zero trust
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.
MITRE detection strategies and analytics
Continue the investigation
Attack tools, simulations and detection rules
Follow explicit source relationships into the reference modules. Linked procedures and detectors are not claims of live validation or actor attribution.
- T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups simulation — Exact active technique ID
- T1098.007 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage