Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Ingress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers. - Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges. Egress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications. - Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected. Protoc…
MITRE mitigation sourceAdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
File Transfer Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Protocols such as SMB, FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 51/100Module 1 — Defensive mission, operating model, and SOC service
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 48/100Module 6 — The Threat Actor Landscape
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Disassembly, decompilation, and code-led analysis
Malware Analysis & Reverse Engineering · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
MITRE mitigation sourceMITRE detection strategies and analytics
- AN1169 · Analytic 1169 — Detects FTP, SMB, or TFTP traffic initiated by suspicious processes like PowerShell, cmd.exe, or rundll32.exe—especially with large outbound file transfers or unbalanced traffic volume.
- AN1170 · Analytic 1170 — Detects usage of FTP, SCP, or TFTP by non-interactive shells or automation scripts transferring large data volumes to untrusted IPs.
- AN1171 · Analytic 1171 — Detects Automator, AppleScript, or Terminal executing curl, lftp, or TFTP for binary transfer to untrusted IPs or unusual ports.
- AN1172 · Analytic 1172 — Detects file movement or outbound TFTP/FTP transfers from ESXi host initiated via shell commands or injected scripts, particularly from scratch partitions or /tmp.
- AN1173 · Analytic 1173 — Detects internal hosts generating large outbound FTP/TFTP/SMB sessions to external IPs, or file transfers using non-standard ports and application mismatches (e.g., FTP over port 80).