- AN0389 · Analytic 0389 — Detects credential harvesting via userland API hooking (e.g., SetWindowsHookEx, IAT, or inline patching) by correlating memory modifications with hook installation functions and suspicious module loads in credential-sensitive processes like lsass.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe.
- AN0390 · Analytic 0390 — Detects credential interception via malicious LD_PRELOAD-based shared libraries loaded into ssh, sudo, or scp processes. Correlates environment variable injection, unexpected library loads, and memory patching behavior.
- AN0391 · Analytic 0391 — Detects DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES abuse to hook credential-sensitive applications by correlating process spawns with unauthorized library injection and monitoring changes to the __TEXT segment (code) of credential handling binaries.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Credential API Hooking
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure. Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. Rootkits detectors can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity. Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Browser, frontend, and cross-origin security
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 57/100Authentication, sessions, and identity lifecycle
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 48/100Module 4 — Collection Sources
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Endpoint live response and volatile acquisition
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Human, workload, pipeline, and emergency identity
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Disk, file-system, and persistence forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 57/100Authentication, sessions, and identity lifecycle
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 48/100Module 4 — Collection Sources
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Endpoint live response and volatile acquisition
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Human, workload, pipeline, and emergency identity
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Disk, file-system, and persistence forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.