Model versus system
Classify the model, wrapper, data path, identity, tool, and downstream side effect separately. The same model can have a different risk profile when connected to different authority.
AI Security Engineering / Module 00 / Chapter 1
Introduction, taxonomy, real security cases, and data foundations for the AI Security Engineering course. This chapter brings the published Medium article’s infographics and video references into the course workspace.
This course chapter is based on the published article: AI Security Course, Module 00 — Part 1: Introduction, AI/ML Taxonomy, and Data Foundations.
The local page preserves the chapter’s media references and connects them to the course’s terminology, architecture, and security evidence workflow. Infographics are reproduced from the author’s publication for course use; video links open the original YouTube destinations.
An AI system is not just a model. It is a chain of data pipelines, artifacts, prompts, retrieval systems, applications, identities, tools, memory, infrastructure, operators, and downstream actions. A generated answer or model score does not automatically provide authorization, tenant isolation, provenance, auditability, or safe execution.
Classify the model, wrapper, data path, identity, tool, and downstream side effect separately. The same model can have a different risk profile when connected to different authority.
Explicit rules, policies, allowlists, and search procedures are security-critical artifacts even when no parameters are learned. Preserve their versions, evaluation order, inputs, and decision path.
Distinguish a confirmed incident, provider observation, disclosed vulnerability, malicious artifact, demonstrated research result, forecast, and constructed scenario.
Authorization, identity, tenant isolation, output validation, egress, logging, and rollback remain application and platform responsibilities.
These terms overlap, but they are not synonyms. The label changes the security question.
Artificial intelligence
├── symbolic rules, search, planning, knowledge, optimization, robotics
└── Machine learning
├── classical statistical and algorithmic ML
└── Deep learning
├── discriminative and representation models
├── embedding models
├── generative models
└── foundation models
├── language models and LLMs
├── vision models
└── multimodal models| Term | What it means | Security question |
|---|---|---|
| AI | The broad field of systems producing predictions, recommendations, decisions, or content. | Which component has authority and what state can it change? |
| Symbolic rules | Explicit human-authored conditions, facts, policies, and actions. | Can inputs bypass, confuse, or reorder the policy path? |
| Machine learning | Behavior learned from data or interaction rather than only hand-written rules. | Who can influence training data, labels, features, feedback, or thresholds? |
| Deep learning | Multilayer neural networks that learn representations and functions. | What was learned, under which distribution, and what happens under shift or evasion? |
| Generative AI | Systems that produce text, code, images, audio, video, or structured content. | Where are output validation, encoding, identity, and egress enforced? |
| Foundation model | A broadly trained reusable starting point for downstream applications. | Is provenance known, is loading safe, and are adapters and revisions controlled? |
| LLM | A language model that predicts and generates sequences of tokens. | Which application controls provide truth checks, authorization, and safe tool execution? |
These are the nine visual assets included with the published chapter. Open any image in a new tab for the locally preserved full-size course copy.









The original article included five YouTube references. They are linked directly here so the course page remains usable without embedding third-party players.
The chapter uses cases to show why taxonomy matters. Each case has different evidence, target assets, and controls.
| Case | Evidence and lesson |
|---|---|
| ShadowRay | Reported exploitation of exposed Ray infrastructure. The platform around AI workloads can expose models, datasets, credentials, and expensive compute. |
| Malicious model artifacts | Public ML artifacts can carry unsafe loading behavior or backdoors. Model provenance, format, loader, and admission controls are supply-chain controls. |
| CVE-2025-32711 / EchoLeak | A disclosed enterprise-AI vulnerability illustrates how retrieved content, instructions, rendering, and outbound paths can combine into impact. |
| MCP tool poisoning | Tool metadata can influence an agent’s planning context. Pin definitions, scope delegated identity, require authorization outside the model, and log approvals. |
Evidence rule: a demonstrated vulnerability, a provider observation, a confirmed incident, and a constructed scenario must not be reported as if they were the same thing.
The published Part 1 also introduces the objects security teams must separate during development and incident response.
| Object | Example | What to preserve |
|---|---|---|
| Data | Phishing messages, RAG documents, prompts, retrieved passages, and feedback. | Source, owner, access policy, provenance, content hash, split, retention. |
| Features | URL features, pixel tensors, token IDs, or embedding vectors. | Extraction code, tokenizer/embedding version, normalization, validation. |
| Labels | phishing/benign, severity, entity spans, or preference choices. | Label policy, source, annotator, confidence, disagreement, policy version. |
| Parameters | Weights, biases, embedding tables, or adapter weights. | Digest, signature, parent checkpoint, adapter list, format, loader. |
| Hyperparameters | Learning rate, threshold, retrieval top-k, temperature, or max output. | Versioned configuration beside the model artifact and release decision. |
| Training / validation / testing | Optimization, development choices, and held-out evaluation. | Code, manifests, split rules, seeds, environment, metrics, exceptions. |
| Inference | A classification, generated answer, embedding, or proposed tool call. | Caller, tenant, model route, context, retrieval, policy, output, side effect. |
Distinguish AI, symbolic rules, ML, deep learning, generative AI, foundation models, and LLMs without using the labels as synonyms.
Identify the data, features, labels, parameters, hyperparameters, and inference boundary in a phishing classifier or RAG assistant.
State whether a case is a confirmed incident, disclosed vulnerability, demonstrated research result, malicious artifact, or constructed scenario.
Name the artifact, configuration, identity, context, tool definition, output, and downstream action needed to reconstruct a security event.