{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1661","id":"T1661","name":"Application Versioning","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1661","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"e54ed0924d5ebe88e370101bb77782dcd7569af33b93cdb96c7ac8382c3d5b60","description":"An adversary may push an update to a previously benign application to add malicious code. This can be accomplished by pushing an initially benign, functional application to a trusted application store, such as the Google Play Store or the Apple App Store. This allows the adversary to establish a trusted userbase that may grant permissions to the application prior to the introduction of malicious code. Then, an application update could be pushed to introduce malicious code.(Citation: android_app_breaking_bad)\n\nThis technique could also be accomplished by compromising a developer’s account. This would allow an adversary to take advantage of an existing userbase without having to establish the userbase themselves. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1661","external_id":"T1661"},{"source_name":"android_app_breaking_bad","description":"Stefanko, L. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved August 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/05/23/android-app-breaking-bad-legitimate-screen-recording-file-exfiltration/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html","external_id":"SPC-20"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"A system prompt for an application permission, with request and response context where observable.","collection_focus":"Correlate own-app request/callback instrumentation with the consented test-device prompt. A request callback alone does not prove a prompt appeared (for example, a previously denied permission).","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","permission","action","prompt_observed","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1661","id":"T1661","name":"Application Versioning","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1661","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1661/","page":"detections/mobile/T1661/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0652","name":"Detection of Application Versioning","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--debfadd8-1df0-43b1-ae16-5f893dfc8bf3","relationship_id":"relationship--18aae8e4-4bdd-42c2-bde6-88d678d080c5","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1735","name":"Analytic 1735","guidance":"For Android, detect Application Versioning by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate File Modification via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: app version change detected in MDM inventory for app_package — update is the binary modification event]; Network Connection Creation via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1735","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"PermissionDeltaAllowList","description":"Expected permission additions per app per planned update. Derived from app developer changelog and IT review."},{"field":"AppBaselineDomains","description":"Pre-update network domain baseline per app. Anchor to prior version. Derive by measurement."},{"field":"PostUpdateWindow","description":"Default 86400s (24hr) post-update behavioral window. Tightening: 3600s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: app version change detected in MDM inventory for app_package — update is the binary modification event","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1735","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1735","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"android:EnterpriseNetworkLog","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1735","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1735","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0116","component":"Permissions Request","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1735","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1735","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0116/"}]},{"id":"AN1736","name":"Analytic 1736","guidance":"For iOS, detect Application Versioning by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate File Modification via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: app version change in MDM inventory for bundle_id]; Network Connection Creation via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1736","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"PermissionDeltaAllowList","description":"Expected privacy permission additions per planned update. Derived from IT app review."},{"field":"AppBaselineDomains","description":"Pre-update domain baseline anchored to prior version."},{"field":"PostUpdateWindow","description":"Default 86400s. Tightening: 3600s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: app version change in MDM inventory for bundle_id","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1736","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1736","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1736","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1736","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0116","component":"Permissions Request","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1736","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0652#AN1736","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0116/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","tag":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1055","name":"SharkBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055","kind":"malware","description":"[SharkBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055) initially poses as a benign application, then malware is downloaded and executed after an application update.(Citation: nccgroup_sharkbot_0322)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ac2d9a5-248b-42c5-af71-3ffad7bc7f3e","references":[{"source_name":"nccgroup_sharkbot_0322","description":"RIFT: Research and Intelligence Fusion Team. (2022, March 3). SharkBot: a “new” generation Android banking Trojan being distributed on Google Play Store. Retrieved January 18, 2023.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/03/sharkbot-a-new-generation-android-banking-trojan-being-distributed-on-google-play-store/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Android 11 and above implement application hibernation, which can hibernate an application that has not been used for a few months and can reset the application’s permission requests.(Citation: app_hibernation)","relationship_id":"relationship--6603a556-9732-4f8b-ac9c-5c3949b251ed","references":[{"source_name":"app_hibernation","description":"Android Developers. (2023, August 28). App hibernation. Retrieved September 21, 2023.","url":"https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/app-hibernation"}]},{"id":"M1012","name":"Enterprise Policy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Enterprises can provision policies to mobile devices for application allow-listing, ensuring only approved applications are installed onto mobile devices.  ","relationship_id":"relationship--4d88c5ac-68c0-4304-9474-d07372d0ad99","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1661":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1661/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1661","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}}]}}