{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1638","id":"T1638","name":"Adversary-in-the-Middle","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"34ddbf2604ac460b4c4cddfb51d1c99aaf1541e9fccd70021f9055ce03fb4da1","description":"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642).  \n\n \n\n[Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638) can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.   \n\n\n Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.(Citation: mitd_kaspersky)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint_research) To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (`READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.    \n\nOutside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as [ARP Cache Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002) or [DHCP Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003).  \n\n \n\nIf applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.(Citation: NSC_Android)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638","external_id":"T1638"},{"source_name":"mitd_checkpoint","description":"Check Point Research Team. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: A New Attack Surface for Android Apps. Retrieved October 31, 2023.","url":"https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/man-in-the-disk-a-new-attack-surface-for-android-apps/"},{"source_name":"mitd_kaspersky","description":"Drozhzhin, A. (2018, August 27). Man-in-the-Disk: A new and dangerous way to hack Android. Retrieved October 31, 2023.","url":"https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-in-the-disk/16089/"},{"source_name":"NSC_Android","description":"Lee, A., Ramirez, T. (2018, August 15). A Security Analyst’s Guide to Network Security Configuration in Android P . Retrieved February 7, 2024.","url":"https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2018/08/15/a-security-analysts-guide-to-network-security-configuration-in-android-p/"},{"source_name":"mitd_checkpoint_research","description":"Makkaveev, S. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: Android Apps Exposed via External Storage. Retrieved October 31, 2023.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/androids-man-in-the-disk/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html","external_id":"CEL-3"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html","external_id":"APP-0"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html","external_id":"APP-1"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-8.html","external_id":"APP-8"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-12.html","external_id":"ECO-12"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"State or changes affecting security-sensitive device configuration.","collection_focus":"Use approved device-management/research-build interfaces to snapshot the specific protected setting; document privileges and unsupported fields.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["device_id","setting","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1638","id":"T1638","name":"Adversary-in-the-Middle","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1638/","page":"detections/mobile/T1638/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0623","name":"Detection of Adversary-in-the-Middle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--7a96a921-48bc-4fcf-b6b8-86a96315d4ee","relationship_id":"relationship--ea8cfefa-f4b5-464a-b4b8-9e3aa587316c","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1687","name":"Analytic 1687","guidance":"For Android, detect Adversary-in-the-Middle by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate File Modification via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: write() to /sdcard/ path]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]; Protected Configuration via Android Enterprise DPC [DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1687","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVPNApps","description":"IT-managed VPN app packages. Minimal."},{"field":"HighValueAppList","description":"Banking, payment, enterprise apps writing to external storage."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: write() to /sdcard/ path","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1687","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1687","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1687","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1687","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1687","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1687","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]},{"id":"AN1688","name":"Analytic 1688","guidance":"For iOS, detect Adversary-in-the-Middle by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]; Protected Configuration via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1688","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVPNApps","description":"IT-approved iOS VPN bundle IDs with Network Extension entitlement. Minimal."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1688","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1688","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1688","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1688","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1688","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0623#AN1688","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","tag":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0288","name":"KeyRaider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288","kind":"malware","description":"Most [KeyRaider](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288) samples hook SSLRead and SSLWrite functions in the itunesstored process to intercept device communication with the Apple App Store.(Citation: Skycure-Profiles)","relationship_id":"relationship--7b1477bc-8fd0-45ce-8eaa-b3b307f18024","references":[{"source_name":"Skycure-Profiles","description":"Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150203010257/https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/"}]},{"id":"S0407","name":"Monokle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407","kind":"malware","description":"[Monokle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407) can install attacker-specified certificates to the device's trusted certificate store, enabling an adversary to perform adversary-in-the-middle attacks.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)","relationship_id":"relationship--93b2474b-0ba6-469e-a4e8-d17a41d0d016","references":[{"source_name":"Xiao-KeyRaider","description":"Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/"}]},{"id":"S1062","name":"S.O.V.A.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062","kind":"malware","description":"[S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062) has included adversary-in-the-middle capabilities.(Citation: threatfabric_sova_0921)","relationship_id":"relationship--e4beccfa-a9a5-447d-8164-d39a1b2c5532","references":[{"source_name":"threatfabric_sova_0921","description":"ThreatFabric. (2021, September 9). S.O.V.A. - A new Android Banking trojan with fowl intentions. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/sova-new-trojan-with-fowl-intentions.html"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Recent OS versions have made it more difficult for applications to register as VPN providers. ","relationship_id":"relationship--7db33293-6971-4c0d-88e0-18f505ebd943","references":[]},{"id":"M1009","name":"Encrypt Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1009","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Applications that properly encrypt network traffic may evade some forms of AiTM behavior. ","relationship_id":"relationship--19b95b83-bac0-455f-882f-0209abddb76f","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1565.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1565.002/","T1642":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1642/","T1638":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1638/","T1557.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1557.002/","T1557.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1557.003/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1638","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}}]}}