{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1636.005","id":"T1636.005","name":"Accounts","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"ace31794802980c49dc75786db4a2662628b6dd036038c8ed07294bf2c46d62d","description":"Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather account data. On Android, this can be accomplished by using the AccountManager API. For example, adversaries may use the `getAccounts()` method to list all accounts.(Citation: Android_AccountManager_Feb2025) On iOS, this can be accomplished by using the Keychain services.  \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, adversaries may be able to access [Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005) without the users’ knowledge or approval. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005","external_id":"T1636.005"},{"source_name":"Android_AccountManager_Feb2025","description":"Android. (2025, February 13). AccountManager. Retrieved September 2, 2025.","url":"https://developer.android.com/reference/android/accounts/AccountManager"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"mobile/T1636","id":"T1636","name":"Protected User Data","domain":"mobile","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["collection"],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"page":"techniques/mobile/T1636/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","device_or_emulator_and_sensor_access_required"],"telemetry_tags":["API Calls","Network Traffic Flow","Permissions Request"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","tag":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","tag":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/mobile/T1636/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Instrumented mobile API calls and results relevant to an application behavior.","collection_focus":"Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","api","result","thread"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"A system prompt for an application permission, with request and response context where observable.","collection_focus":"Correlate own-app request/callback instrumentation with the consented test-device prompt. A request callback alone does not prove a prompt appeared (for example, a previously denied permission).","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","permission","action","prompt_observed","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1636.005","id":"T1636.005","name":"Accounts","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1636.005/","page":"detections/mobile/T1636.005/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0635","name":"Detection of Accounts","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--98f14414-883e-4da3-930a-19a8faa1be41","relationship_id":"relationship--60954386-50d8-413b-b673-c305f99be0e3","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1708","name":"Analytic 1708","guidance":"For Android, detect Accounts by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: AccountManager.getAccounts() OR getAccountsByType() called > $AccountEnumThreshold$ times within $AccountEnumWindow$ by app NOT IN $ApprovedAuthenticatorApps$]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1708","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedAuthenticatorApps","description":"MDM agent, approved authenticator, sync adapter apps. Minimal."},{"field":"AccountEnumThreshold","description":"Default 5 calls — sync adapters call getAccountsByType once per type; bulk = enumeration."},{"field":"AccountEnumWindow","description":"Default 60s."},{"field":"AccountUplinkThreshold","description":"Default 5KB — account metadata is small; even small upload is significant."},{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-app CDN. Derive by measurement."},{"field":"ExfilWindow","description":"Default 120s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0112","component":"API Calls","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: AccountManager.getAccounts() OR getAccountsByType() called > $AccountEnumThreshold$ times within $AccountEnumWindow$ by app NOT IN $ApprovedAuthenticatorApps$","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1708","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1708","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0112/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"android:EnterpriseNetworkLog","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1708","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1708","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0116","component":"Permissions Request","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1708","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1708","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0116/"}]},{"id":"AN1709","name":"Analytic 1709","guidance":"For iOS, detect Accounts by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: SecItemCopyMatching() called with kSecMatchLimitAll]; Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1709","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AccountUplinkThreshold","description":"Default 5KB — credential metadata is small."},{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-app CDN. Derive by measurement."},{"field":"ExfilWindow","description":"Default 120s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0112","component":"API Calls","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: SecItemCopyMatching() called with kSecMatchLimitAll","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1709","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1709","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0112/"},{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1709","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1709","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1709","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0635#AN1709","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","tag":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","tag":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1241","name":"RatMilad","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1241","kind":"malware","description":"[RatMilad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1241) has collected account names and their types from the compromised device.(Citation: ZimperiumGupta_RatMilad_Oct2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--03239f6a-a314-4ee0-81fa-006a39209b63","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumGupta_RatMilad_Oct2022","description":"Gupta, N. (2022, October 5). We Smell A RatMilad Android Spyware. Retrieved August 27, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/we-smell-a-ratmilad-mobile-spyware"}]},{"id":"S1243","name":"DCHSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243","kind":"malware","description":"[DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) has collected account names and their types from the device.(Citation: Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--d622d417-6439-40e8-ac3b-10463beeeb8f","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025","description":"Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/lookout-discovers-iranian-dchsy-surveillanceware"}]},{"id":"S9005","name":"DocSwap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005","kind":"malware","description":"[DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) has the ability to send registered account information.(Citation: EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025)(Citation: S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--e3340c35-81b3-497b-93e6-b59648ad2ccf","references":[{"source_name":"EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025","description":"EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.","url":"https://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-distributing-malicious-mobile-app-via-qr-code"},{"source_name":"S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025","description":"Kim, H., S2W TALON. (2025, March 13). Detailed Analysis of DocSwap Malware Disguised as Security Document Viewer. Retrieved January 12, 2026.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/detailed-analysis-of-docswap-malware-disguised-as-security-document-viewer-218a728c36ff"}]},{"id":"S9006","name":"VajraSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006","kind":"malware","description":"[VajraSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006) has requested for `android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS`.(Citation: K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--99517b2d-0d51-4718-be20-5cafc55b35a5","references":[{"source_name":"K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022","description":"Dhanalakshmi. (2022, April 19).  VajraSpy – An Android RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2025.","url":"https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/vajraspy-an-android-rat/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"OS feature updates often enhance security and privacy around permissions. ","relationship_id":"relationship--77740738-9796-4991-8898-dc2ba10c9c25","references":[]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Access to accounts is an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructed to use extra scrutiny when granting access to their accounts. ","relationship_id":"relationship--fcaf04f2-3944-44f9-898a-e3df3fcf30c7","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1636.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1636.005/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1636.005","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}}]}}
