{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1635","id":"T1635","name":"Steal Application Access Token","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"d5ba972f0d80975b8c4e503a2d2f2aabff10821a8b08d17c410aa3567c712f69","description":"Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering or URI hijacking and typically requires user action to grant access, such as through a system “Open With” dialogue.  \n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework used to issue tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry through OAuth 2.0 using a variety of authorization protocols. An example of a commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested without requiring user credentials.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635","external_id":"T1635"},{"source_name":"Android-AppLinks","description":"Android. (n.d.). Handling App Links. Retrieved December 21, 2016.","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/index.html"},{"source_name":"Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019","description":"Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.","url":"https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/"},{"source_name":"Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols"},{"source_name":"IETF-OAuthNativeApps","description":"W. Denniss and J. Bradley. (2017, October). IETF RFC 8252: OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps. Retrieved November 30, 2018.","url":"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1635.001","id":"T1635.001","name":"URI Hijacking","page":"techniques/mobile/T1635.001/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Instrumented mobile API calls and results relevant to an application behavior.","collection_focus":"Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","api","result","thread"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1635","id":"T1635","name":"Steal Application Access Token","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1635/","page":"detections/mobile/T1635/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0656","name":"Detection of Steal Application Access Token","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--411f7c72-356c-4de6-bbf0-27a7952d3be5","relationship_id":"relationship--2421a94b-d71a-4c37-b5b0-3e12a92d8167","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1743","name":"Analytic 1743","guidance":"For Android, detect Steal Application Access Token by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: PackageManager.queryIntentActivities() returns handler_count > 1 for custom URI scheme]; Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1743","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedURIOwners","description":"URI scheme to package owner mapping from MDM app catalog."},{"field":"MDMApprovedCatalog","description":"MDM-managed app list."},{"field":"OAuthClientAllowList","description":"Enterprise OAuth client_id to package mapping. Derive from enterprise IdP."},{"field":"OAuthFlowWindow","description":"Default 30s between handler resolution and code delivery."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0112","component":"API Calls","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: PackageManager.queryIntentActivities() returns handler_count > 1 for custom URI scheme","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1743","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1743","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0112/"},{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1743","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1743","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1743","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1743","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN1744","name":"Analytic 1744","guidance":"For iOS, detect Steal Application Access Token by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Connection Creation via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1744","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedURIOwners","description":"URI scheme to authorized bundle ID mapping from enterprise IdP OAuth registration."},{"field":"OAuthClientAllowList","description":"Enterprise OAuth client_id to bundle ID mapping."},{"field":"OAuthFlowWindow","description":"Default 30s between code redirect and token exchange."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1744","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1744","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1744","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1744","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1744","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0656#AN1744","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","tag":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"iOS 11 introduced a first-come-first-served principle for URIs, allowing only the prior installed app to be launched via the URI.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking) Android 6 introduced App Links.","relationship_id":"relationship--44304163-9a44-4760-bd04-0e14adb33299","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking","description":"L. Wu, Y. Zhou, M. Li. (2019, July 12).  iOS URL Scheme Susceptible to Hijacking. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20211023221110/https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/"}]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Users should be instructed to not open links in applications they don’t recognize.","relationship_id":"relationship--6a5926f3-8c44-4806-83c2-e8ed0be36bc2","references":[]},{"id":"M1013","name":"Application Developer Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Developers should use Android App Links(Citation: Android App Links) and iOS Universal Links(Citation: iOS Universal Links) to provide a secure binding between URIs and applications, preventing malicious applications from intercepting redirections. Additionally, for OAuth use cases, PKCE(Citation: IETF-PKCE) should be used to prevent use of stolen authorization codes. ","relationship_id":"relationship--d13724d0-a5e2-433b-86bf-ead04359edec","references":[{"source_name":"iOS Universal Links","description":"Apple. (n.d.). Universal Links for Developers. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://developer.apple.com/ios/universal-links/"},{"source_name":"Android App Links","description":"Google. (n.d.). Verify Android App Links. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-site-associations"},{"source_name":"IETF-PKCE","description":"N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.","url":"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1635":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1635/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1635","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}}]}}