{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1630","id":"T1630","name":"Indicator Removal on Host","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"1b4216eac833c4349020f929be5b9387be9fbf7680c2882cfe93192e95fa1f48","description":"Adversaries may delete, alter, or hide generated artifacts on a device, including files, jailbreak status, or the malicious application itself. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of mobile security solutions by causing notable events or information to go unreported.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630","external_id":"T1630"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html","external_id":"APP-43"}],"platforms":["iOS","Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1630.001","id":"T1630.001","name":"Uninstall Malicious Application","page":"techniques/mobile/T1630.001/"},{"key":"mobile/T1630.002","id":"T1630.002","name":"File Deletion","page":"techniques/mobile/T1630.002/"},{"key":"mobile/T1630.003","id":"T1630.003","name":"Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators","page":"techniques/mobile/T1630.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0118","name":"System Settings","page":"telemetry/DC0118/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Mobile system-setting state or changes exposed to the collector.","collection_focus":"Use supported settings/service snapshots before and after the lab action; record scope (device/user/profile) and unavailable settings.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["device_id","setting","scope","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0118","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"airplane_mode","scope":"device","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1630","id":"T1630","name":"Indicator Removal on Host","domain":"mobile","platforms":["iOS","Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1630/","page":"detections/mobile/T1630/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0651","name":"Detection of Indicator Removal on Host","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--1f04ccee-f8b2-4af3-bc34-e5b54d2c883e","relationship_id":"relationship--0ac51c46-97a5-4893-a98d-2dfab8178768","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1733","name":"Analytic 1733","guidance":"For iOS, detect Indicator Removal on Host from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes file deletion, container-local database truncation, or cache-clear operations on supervised device within $CleanupWindow$ of prior data access or upload event]; System Settings via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1733","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedCleanupApps","description":"Privacy cleaner apps approved by IT, MDM agent for managed wipe. Derive from MDM catalog. Tightening: MDM agent only — all other post-exfil cleanup is anomalous."},{"field":"CleanupWindow","description":"Default 300s after exfiltration event (network upload) within which subsequent cleanup is causally linked. Tightening: 60s — immediate post-exfil cleanup."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1733","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1733","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes file deletion, container-local database truncation, or cache-clear operations on supervised device within $CleanupWindow$ of prior data access or upload event","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1733","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1733","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0118","component":"System Settings","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1733","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1733","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0118/"}]},{"id":"AN1734","name":"Analytic 1734","guidance":"For Android, detect Indicator Removal on Host by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes file deletion, database truncation, log clearing, or app-data-clear operations within $CleanupWindow$ of prior data access or network exfiltration event — post-exfil cleanup chain]; System Settings via Android Enterprise DPC [DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1734","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedCleanupApps","description":"Privacy cleaner apps approved by IT, MDM agent for managed wipe. Derive from MDM catalog. Tightening: MDM agent only — all other post-exfil cleanup is anomalous."},{"field":"CleanupWindow","description":"Default 300s after exfiltration event (network upload) within which subsequent cleanup is causally linked. Tightening: 60s — immediate post-exfil cleanup."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1734","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1734","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes file deletion, database truncation, log clearing, or app-data-clear operations within $CleanupWindow$ of prior data access or network exfiltration event — post-exfil cleanup chain","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1734","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1734","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0118","component":"System Settings","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1734","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0651#AN1734","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0118/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0118","name":"System Settings","tag":"System Settings","page":"telemetry/DC0118/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1083","name":"Chameleon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083","kind":"malware","description":"[Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has removed artifacts of its presence and has the ability to uninstall itself.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--01fd0686-d67f-4396-8812-3533063dd6b4","references":[{"source_name":"cyble_chameleon_0423","description":"Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs. (2023, April 13). Banking Trojan targeting mobile users in Australia and Poland. Retrieved August 16, 2023.","url":"https://cyble.com/blog/chameleon-a-new-android-malware-spotted-in-the-wild/"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has requested for the `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` permission to delete files in the device’s external storage.(Citation: MerkleScience_Godfather_April2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--52765114-6cad-4c2c-8e4d-7ccc880cee7d","references":[{"source_name":"MerkleScience_Godfather_April2023","description":"Merkle Science. (2023, April 25). The Godfather Android Malware: Threat under the lens. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/the-godfather-android-malware-threat-under-the-lens"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1001","name":"Security Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Security updates typically provide patches for vulnerabilities that could be abused by malicious applications.","relationship_id":"relationship--ac31f650-4bd2-4bb6-b450-71e66db4888f","references":[]},{"id":"M1002","name":"Attestation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1002","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Attestation can detect unauthorized modifications to devices. Mobile security software can then use this information and take appropriate mitigation action. ","relationship_id":"relationship--fada5ba5-7449-4878-b555-82f225473c8b","references":[]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Inform users that device rooting or granting unnecessary access to the accessibility service presents security risks that could be taken advantage of without their knowledge.","relationship_id":"relationship--ddfc5d8c-750d-424a-88d9-acc99bc5f69e","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1630":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1630/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1630","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0118","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"airplane_mode","scope":"device","before":false,"after":true}}]}}