{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1629","id":"T1629","name":"Impair Defenses","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"520743f845004c830e597686f55e00ed3cb1c6cfa518943e6737dfca3347506f","description":"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users or mobile endpoint administrators.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629","external_id":"T1629"},{"source_name":"Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense","description":"Samsung Knox Partner Program. (n.d.). Knox for Mobile Threat Defense. Retrieved March 30, 2022.","url":"https://partner.samsungknox.com/mtd"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html","external_id":"APP-22"}],"platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1629.001","id":"T1629.001","name":"Prevent Application Removal","page":"techniques/mobile/T1629.001/"},{"key":"mobile/T1629.002","id":"T1629.002","name":"Device Lockout","page":"techniques/mobile/T1629.002/"},{"key":"mobile/T1629.003","id":"T1629.003","name":"Disable or Modify Tools","page":"techniques/mobile/T1629.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1629","id":"T1629","name":"Impair Defenses","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1629/","page":"detections/mobile/T1629/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0687","name":"Detection of Impair Defenses","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0687","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--5560747b-ad67-478e-b3f2-14e55864e532","relationship_id":"relationship--53aa0360-fbe6-4007-887c-a9e5ddadea74","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1797","name":"Analytic 1797","guidance":"For Android, detect Impair Defenses from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes package management, DevicePolicyManager, or settings operations capable of disabling security tooling — API invocation to disable security control]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0687#AN1797","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"ElevationAllowList","description":"MDM agent and approved Device Admin apps only. Any other app acquiring Device Admin then modifying security settings is Impair Defenses."},{"field":"SecurityToolPackageList","description":"MDM agent, AV, MTD packages deployed on managed fleet. Derive from MDM enrollment configuration."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1797","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0687#AN1797","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes package management, DevicePolicyManager, or settings operations capable of disabling security tooling — API invocation to disable security control","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1797","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0687#AN1797","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1225","name":"CherryBlos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225","kind":"malware","description":"[CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) has sent the victim back to the home screen when the victim navigates to the malicious application's settings and has automatically approved any permission requests by clicking on the \"Allow\" button when a system dialogue appears.(Citation: TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--817d1e5f-5795-4189-81dc-bf90476e7adc","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023","description":"Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 28). Related CherryBlos and FakeTrade Android Malware Involved in Scam Campaigns. Retrieved March 28, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/g/cherryblos-and-faketrade-android-malware-involved-in-scam-campai.html"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has intercepted API returns from banking apps that detect malicious services, and modifies the methods to return back an empty list hiding the presence of the malware and other active services.(Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--3b55245d-6a26-4ecd-8f2f-305f8dbd572c","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025","description":"Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/your-mobile-app-their-playground-the-dark-side-of-the-virtualization"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1001","name":"Security Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities that could be exploited for root access. Root access is often a requirement to impairing defenses.","relationship_id":"relationship--96298aed-9e9f-4836-b29b-04c88e79e53e","references":[]},{"id":"M1004","name":"System Partition Integrity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1004","kind":"course-of-action","description":"System partition integrity mechanisms, such as Verified Boot, can detect the unauthorized modification of system files.","relationship_id":"relationship--d2d7476e-66a4-4d46-877c-6e80678bbb38","references":[]},{"id":"M1010","name":"Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1010","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Mobile security software can typically detect if a device has been rooted or jailbroken and can inform the user, who can then take appropriate action.","relationship_id":"relationship--825ffecc-090f-44c8-87be-f7b72e07f987","references":[]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Providing user guidance around commonly abused features, such as the modal that requests for administrator permissions, should aid in preventing impairing defenses.","relationship_id":"relationship--a8c21a71-f3e9-43e9-9212-faf9181e70ce","references":[]},{"id":"M1012","name":"Enterprise Policy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012","kind":"course-of-action","description":"An EMM/MDM can use the Android `DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices` method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.","relationship_id":"relationship--eb784dcf-4188-47e2-9217-837b262acfb9","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1629":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1629/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1629","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}}]}}