{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1627","id":"T1627","name":"Execution Guardrails","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"a3c2ac86e5d52abe3939ce758e3b8f4bf8d54045e27c7853f67d4249c5129b32","description":"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include environment information such as location.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [System Checks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633/001). While use of [System Checks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633/001) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627","external_id":"T1627"},{"source_name":"SWB Exodus March 2019","description":"Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200314194610/https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1627.001","id":"T1627.001","name":"Geofencing","page":"techniques/mobile/T1627.001/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1627","id":"T1627","name":"Execution Guardrails","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1627/","page":"detections/mobile/T1627/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0653","name":"Detection of Execution Guardrails","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--80e1ef21-9454-4000-ae75-d7a5ae8e703b","relationship_id":"relationship--37ee0a2d-bf61-4d71-98a4-6a9fbf28a85c","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1737","name":"Analytic 1737","guidance":"For Android, detect Execution Guardrails from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App performs burst of environmental check APIs (Build properties, TelephonyManager IMSI, PackageManager security-tool query) at cold launch before user interaction — multi-category environment fingerprint is the guardrail setup]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1737","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"GuardrailCheckWindow","description":"Default 30s at cold launch. Environmental checks at launch before user interaction are guardrail setup. Post-interaction checks may be feature-driven."},{"field":"PopulationComparisonRequired","description":"Behavioral fork detection requires telemetry across multiple device populations (enrolled vs unenrolled). Without population comparison, single-device detection is Low confidence."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1737","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1737","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"android:EMM","channel":"Managed package inventory/status and package metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1737","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1737","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App performs burst of environmental check APIs (Build properties, TelephonyManager IMSI, PackageManager security-tool query) at cold launch before user interaction — multi-category environment fingerprint is the guardrail setup","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1737","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1737","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]},{"id":"AN1738","name":"Analytic 1738","guidance":"For iOS, detect Execution Guardrails from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App performs UIDevice model + iOS version + enrollment state checks at cold launch before user interaction — device fingerprinting guardrail setup]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1738","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"GuardrailCheckWindow","description":"Default 30s at cold launch. Environmental checks at launch before user interaction are guardrail setup. Post-interaction checks may be feature-driven."},{"field":"PopulationComparisonRequired","description":"Behavioral fork detection requires telemetry across multiple device populations (enrolled vs unenrolled). Without population comparison, single-device detection is Low confidence."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1738","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1738","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1738","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1738","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App performs UIDevice model + iOS version + enrollment state checks at cold launch before user interaction — device fingerprinting guardrail setup","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1738","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0653#AN1738","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1215","name":"Binary Validator","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1215","kind":"malware","description":"[Binary Validator](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1215) has checked if the device is jailbroken.(Citation: SecureList OpTriangulation 23Oct2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--082c3bd7-6088-4364-ae75-0eb45a635583","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList OpTriangulation 23Oct2023","description":"Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, October 23). The outstanding stealth of Operation Triangulation. Retrieved April 18, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/triangulation-validators-modules/110847/"}]},{"id":"S9005","name":"DocSwap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005","kind":"malware","description":"[DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) has checked if the victim has accessed the malicious URL from a PC. If so, [DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) redirected the victim to scan the malicious QR code using a mobile device.(Citation: EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--698d6406-b2a9-4038-b3c7-37c0fff8999e","references":[{"source_name":"EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025","description":"EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.","url":"https://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-distributing-malicious-mobile-app-via-qr-code"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"New OS releases frequently contain additional limitations or controls around device location access.","relationship_id":"relationship--442dd700-2d7d-4cad-8282-9027e4f69133","references":[]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Users should be advised to be extra scrutinous of applications that request location or sensitive phone information permissions, and to deny any permissions requests for applications they do not recognize.","relationship_id":"relationship--b8606318-8c12-4381-ba33-5b2321772ea0","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1633.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1633.001/","T1627":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1627/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1627","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}}]}}