{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1617","id":"T1617","name":"Hooking","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"b34f822ebca4441693d8a74a6065c043d835040940161e6e22c170bb8d9ef88e","description":"Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617","external_id":"T1617"}],"platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1617","id":"T1617","name":"Hooking","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1617/","page":"detections/mobile/T1617/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0719","name":"Detection of Hooking","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0719","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--2d8db41e-e12e-46ff-be11-2810b0a2acb5","relationship_id":"relationship--920be05e-3d07-4e69-b28d-d8669cf43fd7","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1850","name":"Analytic 1850","guidance":"For Android, detect Hooking from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App process loads external code module or native library from non-system path injected into zygote or app_process runtime — abnormal library injection path is the hooking mechanism indicator]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0719#AN1850","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"RootStatusChangeWindow","description":"Default 3600s — hooking framework deployment may lag root acquisition. Root detection is the gate; hooking evidence narrows within the window."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1850","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0719#AN1850","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App process loads external code module or native library from non-system path injected into zygote or app_process runtime — abnormal library injection path is the hooking mechanism indicator","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1850","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0719#AN1850","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0407","name":"Monokle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407","kind":"malware","description":" [Monokle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407) can hook itself to appear invisible to the Process Manager.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) ","relationship_id":"relationship--5d2a3a9f-2467-4ac6-ab64-ffe91ec584da","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Monokle","description":"Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1208","name":"FjordPhantom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1208","kind":"malware","description":"[FjordPhantom](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1208) has used the hooking framework in a variety of ways, including returning false information to detection mechanisms, pretending that GooglePlayServices are unavailable, and manipulating UI functionality.(Citation: Promon FjordPhantom Oct2024) ","relationship_id":"relationship--d9c63320-5855-42dc-8cd5-595755495259","references":[{"source_name":"Promon FjordPhantom Oct2024","description":"Promon Security Research Team. (2024, October 1). Retrieved February 19, 2025.","url":"https://promon.io/security-news/fjordphantom-android-malware"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has used the Xposed hooking framework to intercept HTTP requests and responses, capturing and exfiltrating sensitive information, such as credentials.(Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025)  ","relationship_id":"relationship--72bb936a-a255-4823-9675-b39c7e19873c","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025","description":"Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/your-mobile-app-their-playground-the-dark-side-of-the-virtualization"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1002","name":"Attestation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1002","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Device attestation can often detect rooted devices.","relationship_id":"relationship--290c9d3f-f59b-4e2b-9b7b-115014845c15","references":[]},{"id":"M1010","name":"Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1010","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Mobile security products can often detect rooted devices.","relationship_id":"relationship--bee919a6-c488-49a0-9848-fff19aa2c276","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1617":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1617/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1617","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}}]}}